

# Electric Vehicle Subsidies: Cost-Effectiveness and Emission Reductions

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2<sup>nd</sup> AFET Conference

November 2024

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# Motivation

- Transportation sector is a major contributor to air emissions that cause global warming and climate changes
- Provided clean electricity production upstream, **electrification** is one way of abating these emissions
- Several factors impede widespread adoption:
  - Price is prohibitive
  - Availability of charging points
- **Network effects:** While adoption is high, market demand for charging services is high → increases adoption

# This paper

- **Policy:** Electric vehicle subsidies as a tool to boost adoption
- **Context:** Charging networks are provided as a public good
- Interaction between **subsidies** and **public provision** of stations
- **Research question:** *“Should we subsidize EV as an emission abatement tool?”*
  - Focus on Canada’s car market
  - **Quebec** province, between 2012–2020
  - Subsidies are substantial  $\approx 17\%$  of list price ( $\approx \$9,800$ )
  - $\approx 83\%$  of charging stations are public

# Context

- Public network developed in partnership with local governments
- **Provincial government** provides platform
  - Software infrastructure (billing, phone app, technical support)
  - Prices are regulated (wholesale and retail)
- **Local governments** decide on deployment strategy in their region
- Friction between provincial and local governments objectives
  - **Provincial-level:** Increase adoption
  - **Municipal-level:** Provide a service to local population

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  - Could be unique to the Canadian setting
- Evidence of **small environmental gains**
  - Total spending on program: \$723M
  - Abated emissions: -0.7% (over lifetime of vehicles)
  - Marginal abatement cost: \$338 / ton

# Plan

1. Effect of EV subsidies on **sales** and **station deployment**
  - Comparing **Ontario** and **Quebec** rebate programs
  - Difference-in-difference analysis
  - Study the **short-run effects** of subsidies
  
2. Effect of EV subsidies on **emissions** and **policy design**
  - Zoom-in on **Quebec**
  - Structural estimation
  - Charging station infrastructure provided as **public good** by **forward-looking** local planner (county-level governments)
  - Unified framework for conducting **cost-benefit analysis**



# Data

## 1. Car sales

- **Quebec:** All registered vehicles (micro data)
- **Ontario:** New car registrations (agg. county-level)

## 2. Car characteristics

- The Car Guide and the Auto Trader websites
- Includes: retail price, power, size, fuel consumption, etc.

## 3. Network

- Natural Resources Canada
- Includes: installation date, coordinates, pricing, ownership, etc.


## 4. Demographics

- Canadian Census of Households (2011, 2016, 2021)
- Survey of Household Spending

# Financial incentives

- 2012 – both provinces offer similar incentives (\$8,000 – \$8,500)
- 2016 – **Ontario** program **bonified** (\$8,500 → \$14,000)
- 2019 – **Ontario** program **phased out** (\$14,000 → \$0)


Figure 1: Financial incentives



# Effect on electric vehicle sales

- **Event study:** Dependent variable  $\rightarrow \ln(\text{SalesEV}_{mt})$

Figure 2: Effect of subsidizing EV on adoption




- **Takeaway:** Subsidizing EV generates additional sales

## Effect on network size

- **Event study:** Dependent variable  $\rightarrow \ln(\text{NetworkSize}_{mt})$

Figure 3: Effect of subsidizing EV on charging station provision



- **Takeaway:** Charging station networks do not respond to increased adoption from EV subsidies (short run)

# Structural model

- Study **environmental performance** and **cost-effectiveness** of subsidies
- Rely on a **structural model**
  1. **Demand** (static)
    - Discrete choice model (RC logit)
    - Consumers care about the **opportunity of recharging** when purchasing an EV
  2. **Network supply** (dynamic)
    - Model of **public good** provision by **forward-looking** local planners
    - Local planners install charging capacity to maximize the **aggregate utility of charging** in their region
- Perform **cost-benefit analysis**

# Results

- **Counterfactual:** Focus on **Quebec**
  - Remove all subsidies
  - Reevaluate equilibrium sales + network provision

Table 1: Counterfactual simulation

	Baseline	Counterfactuals: No Subsidies			
		Fixed network		Network adjusts	
Δ Total sales	3.248M	-12,415	(-0.38%)	-13,126	(-0.40%)
Δ Sales (electric)	84,174	-37,920	(-45.05%)	-40,187	(-47.74%)
Δ Charging stations	2,811	0	(0.00%)	-257	(-9.14%)
Δ CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	141.46Mt	+0.995Mt	(+0.70%)	+1.053Mt	(+0.74%)
Total cost	723.2M				

# Cost-benefit analysis


- **Policymaker** takes into account:
  - Welfare (i.e. consumer surplus, profits)
  - Total cost of policy
  - Total value of environmental damage (in dollars)
- Picks policy such that

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial \text{Welfare}}{\partial \text{Emission}} - \frac{\partial \text{Total Cost}}{\partial \text{Emission}}}_{\substack{\text{Marginal} \\ \text{Abatement} \\ \text{Cost}}} = \underbrace{P^E}_{\substack{\text{Cost of} \\ \text{Carbon}}}$$

- Welfare, total cost, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions can all be obtained using primitives of the model

# Marginal abatement cost curve

Figure 4: Marginal and average abatement cost curve



- **Social cost of carbon:** \$183 per ton
- **Takeway:** Over-investment on policy (beyond optimal level)



# Cost-effective policy

Table 2: Cost-benefit analysis and cost-effective policies

Description	Calibration						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Parameters</b>							
• Profit weight ( $\psi_1$ )	0	0	0	0.27	0.27	1	1
• Consumer surplus weight ( $\psi_2$ )	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
• Marginal cost of public funds ( $\phi$ )	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.5	1.3
<b>Cost estimates</b>							
• Marginal abatement cost	873	600	338	552	290	595	420
• Average abatement cost	696	368	160	321	112	330	191
<b>Cost-effective policy (High SCC: \$183)</b>							
• Provincial rebate	0	1,208	4,808	2,016	5,808	2,168	4,176
• Federal rebate	0	755	3,005	1,260	3,630	1,355	2,610

Notes: The provincial rebate and federal incentive programs subsidize electric vehicle by up to \$8,000 and \$5,000 respectively. The federal incentive is available as of 2019.

# Conclusion

- Develop a structural model of the EV market, where charging is provided as a **public good**
- Study the impact of **subsidies** on the Canadian EV market
- Findings:
  - Subsidies are very effective at **increasing adoption**
  - Not as effective at **abating emissions**
  - Cost-benefit analysis suggests an **over-investment** on rebates
- More findings:
  - Evidence of **low synergy** between subsidies and the public provision of stations (weak network effects)
  - Evidence that **ignoring dynamics** leads to over-estimating these network effects

Thank you!